(Latest Op-Ed First; Verbatim Compilation of The Hindu
Op-Ed; Best to read in the order of oldest to latest article to get a
comprehensive understanding; Consider repetition to be revision)
CPC clears the decks for third term for Xi (26.02.18)
Communist party for lifting two-term limit on Presidency
China on Sunday cleared the decks for President Xi Jinping’s
third consecutive term in office, ahead of a crucial session of parliament next
month.
China’s Xinhua news agency reported that Communist Party of
China (CPC) proposed on Sunday that the President and the Vice-President will
not be constitutionally restricted to two consecutive terms in office. This, in
effect, means that Mr. Xi, who is serving his second consecutive five-year
term, can continue beyond 2023.
Role for ally
Analysts point out that the removal of a two-term
restriction on the Vice-President is also significant. There is speculation
that Wang Qishan, the country’s anti-corruption czar and Mr. Xi’s trusted ally,
who officially retired in November, could be reappointed as Vice-President.
Alternatively, he could head a new National Supervisory
Commission that will be empowered to throw its dragnet beyond the 86 million
members of the CPC, including private business houses. Xinhua said the CPC had
proposed that the expression that the President and the Vice-President “shall
serve no more than two consecutive terms” be removed from the Constitution.
More time for reforms
Some observers, however, highlight that the CPC’s move is
not confined to Mr. Xi’s term, but is a deeper long-term initiative. “I think
the biggest issue is the transition of power after Mr. Xi, as the work he is
doing to reform the party and economy is substantial and necessary,” political
commentator Einar Tangen, told The Hindu . He added: “Due to the
massive changes in government, and with more to come, it is probable that to
implement these changes and let them take root, he [Mr. Xi] will need more
time.”
The announcement came after the powerful 25-member Politburo
met on Saturday. On Monday, the Central Committee of the CPC will meet to
discuss the proposed changes. The flurry of political activity will culminate
in the March 3 session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s
parliament. The NPC will give final shape to major decisions taken at the
National Party Congress held in October 2017.
Xinhua also reported that the party proposed that Mr. Xi’s
political theory — Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era — be written into the Constitution. Besides, the formation of the
National Supervisory Commission, as a constitutional entity, was planned.
XXX
The rise and rise of Xi Jinping (04.11.17)
The recently-concluded 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China was
an intricately choreographed political theatre which showcased President Xi
Jinping’s primacy, his vision and his status as the helmsman of the party and
the nation. China’s confidence in the validity of its chosen path and its
ambitions of “restoring” its global leadership role were also on full display.
While this conclave was more about reaffirmation of trends
evolving since Mr. Xi’s ascendance to power at the 18th Party Congress, rather
than charting out new policy directions, it has significant implications for
India.
Signature ideology
The Congress has confirmed Mr. Xi’s standing as the most
powerful Chinese leader in the post-Deng era. His vision for the future of
China, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era”, is enshrined in the party constitution as part of its guiding ideology.
A Xinhua commentary gushingly suggests that “Xi Jinping’s
thought will be China’s signature ideology and the new communism”, the
implication being that it supersedes and encompasses the doctrinal offerings of
previous leaders.
Mr. Xi has become the only leader after Mao (with his “Mao
Zedong Thought”) to have his eponymous ideological contribution written into the
party charter while in office. “Deng Xiaoping Theory” was adopted after Deng’s
death, and contributions of two of Mr. Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao
(“Scientific Outlook”) and Jiang Zemin (“Three Represents”), are not named
after them.
While this self-elevation and his position as the “lingxiu”,
a wise and great leader, makes Mr. Xi the principal arbiter of China’s future
directions over the next five years and possibly beyond, it is does not yet put
him on a par with Mao and Deng. Arguably, Deng did not need a theory named
after him or to hold many offices to bring about transformational changes in
China. Mr. Xi is a transformative leader in the making but has a long way to go
before he can rival Mao and Deng in impact and legacy.
Mr. Xi has, however, taken decisive steps to move away from
Deng’s legacy in four key areas: collective leadership; identification of
successors well ahead of the transfer of power; a measure of differentiation
between the party and the state; and the dictum of China biding its time,
keeping a low profile and never claiming leadership.
Deng had institutionalised collective leadership to correct
the problems of “excessive concentration of power” witnessed under Mao. With
Mr. Xi steadily accumulating levers of authority and eliminating rivals, there
has been a shift towards personalised rule in his first term and now at the
Party Congress. The erosion of checks that it involves has attendant risks for
China.
The new team
The new Politburo is packed with Mr. Xi’s close associates.
By one count, there are as many as 14 of his allies among 25 members of the
Politburo. However, the composition of the seven-member Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) is more balanced and possibly the result of a compromise, thus
suggesting limits to Mr. Xi’s authority. Premier Li Keqiang has retained his
position, along with Mr. Xi, and of five new members, only one (Li Zhanshu) is
seen as a Xi protégé, while others have links to his predecessors but cannot be
described as rivals. Mr. Xi had changed virtually all Provincial Party
Secretaries in the months ahead of the 19th Congress, and appointments since
the Congress have underlined his sway over personnel matters.
In another departure from the post-Deng practice, no
potential successor to Mr. Xi has been included in the new line-up of the PBSC.
This has kept open the possibility of him staying on as the paramount leader or
the power behind the throne well beyond 2022, when he completes his second term
as the party leader.
Though the party constitution rules out “life tenure”, it
sets no term limits for any office, unlike the state constitution which has a
two-term limit for presidency and other senior positions. It is still too early
to figure out how the post-2022 scenario will pan out, but it seems unlikely today
that Mr. Xi will completely exit from the leadership position as his
predecessor Hu Jintao did at the end of his second term.
The absence of a succession plan has potential perils in a
party which has witnessed destructive factional feuds in the past.
Mr. Xi’s penchant for the dominance of the party, including
in the economic domain, has received a boost at the Congress. In his work
report, he reaffirmed a key message of his 2013 third plenum policy statement
that the market should play the “decisive” role in allocation of resources but
the state would take the “leading role” in the economy. His preference for
maintaining a strong state and party role in the economy with minimal
privatisation of state-owned assets and firm control over social and financial
risks is unlikely to change in the wake of the Congress. Likewise, while he is
positioning China as a defender of globalisation, it comes with a strong dose
of mercantilism.
For India, one key outcome of the party conclave is the
articulation of China’s increasingly explicit great power ambitions. In his
speech, Mr. Xi talked about China becoming “a global leader of composite
national strength and international influence” and moving closer to the
centre-stage by mid-century. A Xinhua commentary of October 24 is more candid:
“By 2050… China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the
world.”
In sync with Mr. Xi’s “Chinese dream” enunciated five years
ago, an overarching theme of the Party Congress was the “great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation” and “restoration” of China’s centrality on the global
stage. In his speech, Mr. Xi spoke of China as a “strong country” or “great
power” as many as 30 times, jettisoning the earlier coyness about the country’s
great power ambitions.
The preoccupation with building up global combat
capabilities to safeguard China’s overseas interests also figures prominently
in Mr. Xi’s vision. Arguably the most ambitious restructuring of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) in the last 50 years currently underway is focussed on
joint command, power projection capability and the party’s control on the
military. Mr. Xi has set the goal of completing modernisation of the armed
forces by 2035 and transforming the PLA into a world-class military by 2050.
In a significant departure from China’s position in the
post-Mao period of not seeking to export its model, Mr. Xi has suggested that
“the Chinese path… offers a new option for other countries and nations who want
to speed up their development while preserving their independence, and it
offers Chinese wisdom and approach to solving problems facing mankind”. It is
to be seen how far China will go to promote its model as an alternative to
liberal, capitalist democracy and the “Washington Consensus”.
However, China is likely to intensify its efforts to shape
its periphery and forge a “world community of shared destiny” centred around
it. With the U.S. in temporary retreat and the West distracted by internal
challenges, China considers this to be a period of strategic opportunity to
take its great power project to the next level in the new era that Mr. Xi has
envisioned.
The BRI gauntlet
Mr. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the key
instrument in this grand strategy and it is now embedded in the party constitution.
There is nothing to suggest that China is inclined to address India’s concerns
about the BRI.
In a development possibly linked to China’s enhanced global
agenda, for the first time since 2003, the Politburo includes a diplomat, State
Councillor Yang Jiechi. As the Chinese special representative for boundary
talks with India, he has had extensive interactions with us.
It may also be noted that since his 2014 visit to India,
President Xi has emerged as the principal Chinese interlocutor for Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. In the past, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh engaged primarily
with Premier Wen Jiabao. Given Mr. Xi’s pre-eminence, his being personally
invested in the relationship with India has its advantages.
Looking ahead, a more assertive China will be one of the
most critical factors shaping India’s external environment, apart from
engendering new challenges in the management of bilateral relations, more so as
the footprints of the two re-emergent countries will increasingly overlap.
Ashok K. Kantha, a former Ambassador of India to China,
is Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies and Distinguished Fellow with
Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi
XXX
The
rise and rise of Xi Jinping (31.10.17)
With the new title of ‘core leader’, President Xi Jinping
has further cemented his authority within the Communist Party of China and
the government. Already the party chief, the head of state, the
commander-in-chief of the military and the one in charge of the group
overseeing the change in the economy, he is now on a par with Mao Zedong and
Deng Xiaoping. This concentration of power in Mr. Xi’s hands stands in sharp
contrast with the ‘collective responsibility’ dictum the party propagated
during the Hu Jintao regime. Mr. Hu was not called a core leader. From the
beginning, Mr. Xi had signalled he would be a leader different from his
immediate predecessor. He gradually emerged as the most influential leader at
least since Deng, and demonstrated his authority by launching a massive
clean-up in the name of fighting corruption, that felled top leaders of the
party and the military. Corruption is a major problem in today’s China. The
high economic growth that followed the reforms initiated by Deng spawned
massive, institutionalised corruption, stoking public anger against the
establishment. Mr. Xi built his war on “corrupt officials” against the backdrop
of such a mood of anger, and his efforts have been generally well-received
despite criticism that he is using the campaign to amass powers to himself. The
party plenum, by appointing Mr. Xi as the core leader, has sent a clear message
to the public that it stands by him and his policies.
The timing of the appointment is significant. The plenum
kicks off year-long preparations for the party congress next year, which could
shake up the leadership. Five of the seven current members of the Politburo
Standing Committee, the inner sanctum of power in China, and a third of the
Politburo’s 18 members are due to retire next year. Being the core leader, Mr.
Xi will be in a stronger position to influence the outcome of the congress. As
in the case of his predecessors, Mr. Xi would certainly prefer to have the
Standing Committee filled with his allies. But this doesn’t mean that Mr. Xi is
guaranteed a second term free of challenges and of unchecked power. If the Hu
Jintao era, despite some allegations of corruption, is regarded as one of
prosperous and peaceful rise for China, Mr. Xi’s term has been marked by
slowing economic growth and geopolitical tensions. Even if Mr. Xi gathers
unprecedented powers in the party and the state, his tenure will be judged by
how he addresses fundamental problems that China faces, including systemic
inequities and foreign policy challenges, while managing the economic rebalance
process.
XXX
The life of Xi (26.10.17)
When Xi
Jinping was elected the leader of China and the Communist Party five
years ago, many had predicted that he would become the most powerful leader
since Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the country’s economic rise. They may be
wrong. With the 19th party congress, which concluded on Tuesday and has written
his name and ideas into the party constitution, Mr. Xi now appears to be the
strongest leader since Mao Zedong. This amassing of Mao-like powers could also
allow Mr. Xi to stay in power beyond the usual two terms. Two of Mr. Xi’s
predecessors had stepped down after two terms to ensure an orderly transition
in the party and the government, where there is no dearth of talented and
ambitious leaders. The practice has been for the mid-term party congress to
choose the likely successor of the incumbent and groom him over five years to
eventually take over the reins. However, the party doesn’t seem to have chosen
anyone this time. All five new faces in the seven-member Politburo Standing
Committee, the highest decision-making body in China, are in their 60s, which
lends credence to speculation that Mr. Xi is not planning to step down when his
second term ends in 2022. Even if he does step down from the government, given
the stature he has already achieved within the party, he could retain a
Deng-like sway over policy matters.
In Mr. Xi’s world view, China has
passed two eras — the revolutionary era launched by Mao and the economic
reforms spearheaded by Deng. The “Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese
characteristics for a New Era” that has been written into the party charter
marks “a new era”. This one is about making China economically stronger and
geopolitically more influential. In his three-and-a-half-hour speech at the
congress, Mr. Xi placed great emphasis on strengthening the military and
resisting “the whole range of erroneous viewpoints”. The message is that the
era of “peaceful rise” is over. The more combative foreign policy Mr. Xi’s
administration is pursuing will continue, perhaps more aggressively, while at
home he will consolidate more power. But this doesn’t mean it will be a
cakewalk. If China takes a more aggressive, militaristic view of its
neighbourhood, it could trigger an aggressive response from neighbours such as
India and Japan. North Korea remains as much a foreign policy problem for Mr.
Xi as for President Donald Trump. China’s export-oriented economy is still not
free from the global economic whirlwinds. Mr. Xi will have to factor in global
market concerns while taking key economic decisions at home. Besides, though
the transition in the Communist Party has been orderly at least in the last 30
years, it was not free from troubles. Mr. Xi would be mindful of how he
projects his own power, lest it triggers a backlash. The challenge before him
is to find a balance between his ambitions and the realities that China
confronts today.
(All of the above articles have been taken straight from The
Hindu. We owe it all to them. This is just an effort to consolidate opinions
expressed in The Hindu in a subject-wise manner.)
