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Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 27

Agni V Success




Twitterati Agni V Success



Objective Information on Agni V:

1) The Agni V is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5,500 to 5,800 km.

2) Agni V is nuclear capable, with a payload capacity of 1,500 kg of high-explosive warhead.

3) It has been developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP).

4) It is the fifth variant in the series of medium to long range Agni missiles. Agni I, II, III have already been inducted for military use.

5) The successful induction of Agni V will give India long-range strike capability.

6) The missile has previously been tested in 2012, 2013 and 2015.

7) Once the Agni-V is inducted, India will join the superexclusive club of countries with ICBMs (missiles with a range of over 5,000-5,500km) alongside the US, Russia, China, France, UK.

8) Agni-V is capable of striking even the northernmost parts of China

Significance of Agni V Success:

Boost to India’s Arsenal: With this test, Agni-V is now ready for induction into the Strategic Forces Command, which already operates other Agni missiles with a target range from 700 km to 4,000 km, besides Prithvi-II.

Credible Nuclear Deterrence: Successful test-firing of the long-range ballistic missile Agni-V for the fourth time is a significant step towards building a credible nuclear deterrence. With this test and the recent commissioning of the indigenously built nuclear submarine INS Arihant, India is inching towards creating a robust and world-class second-strike capability. For a nation sworn to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a reliable second-strike capability is an absolute necessity.

Apart from whole of Pakistan, China too in range: India already has nuclear-capable missiles that can reach all of Pakistan and Agni V is clearly intended to provide a similar deterrent capability with respect to China.

Big Boost to India’s Defence Development Structure: Agni V has lived up to the hopes of its creators at the Defence Research & Development Organisation. Agni V missile is “a game-changer” that can perform different roles, from carrying multiple warheads to providing anti-satellite capability and even launching tiny satellites into orbit. Like its progenitor, Agni III, this missile has a two-metre diameter (as compared to the one-metre diameter of Agni I and II). Agni III and V are therefore the first Indian missiles that can potentially be equipped with several warheads each (known as Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles or MIRV). MIRVs, however, pose their own technological challenges, especially the need to considerably shrink the size and weight of nuclear warheads. Despite China's earlier start, its ballistic missiles are still thought to be equipped with single warheads, not MIRVs.

Way Ahead:

Neighbours must start talking with each other on Nuclear Matters: Responsible possession of nuclear-armed missiles for the purposes of deterrence also requires working assiduously to remove sources of friction that can erupt into open conflict. It is also important that India, Pakistan and China start talking to each other on nuclear matters.

* From bases in Qinghai and Yunnan provinces, Chinese missiles too can reach all of India.
* An assessment carried out by an Indian strategic studies group found that Pakistan had a “credible deterrent structure” organised around the solid-propellant Shaheen-1 and -2 missiles.

Nuclear Triad not yet complete or competent: Just a few days ago, the Nirbhay land attack cruise missile meant to carry nuclear warheads failed for the fourth time during a test. There are several such gaps to be filled to ensure a foolproof nuclear triad.

A credible second-strike capability should also be complemented by a modern, powerful military:  The Indian military is in crying need of modernisation across its three arms.

* The Air Force has a huge shortage of fighters;
* The Navy’s submarine arm is far from meeting multiple challenges;
* The Army needs an array of new platforms.


Note: Definition of Nuclear Triad: A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three basic components: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Sunday, September 25

India-Afghanistan Relations: Challenges and Prospects

India-Afghanistan Relations: Challenges and Prospects


UPSC GENERAL STUDIES: PAPER II (India and its neighbourhood relations)

Table of Contents
Present Situation in Afghanistan
India’s linkages with & broad objectives in Afghanistan
Recent Lows and Highs of India Afghanistan Relationship
Guiding Principles for India’s Afghanistan Policy
Novel Ways of Extending Assistance to Afghanistan
India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement

“The closeness of the India-Afghanistan relationship is not a new phenomenon. It has existed since time immemorial. And as a close friend, ever since India's Independence, we have done and will continue to do whatever is required to be done to see Afghanistan grow and progress as a close friend.”
PM Narendra Modi

“India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.”
Former PM Manmohan Singh


“India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.”


Present Situation in Afghanistan

Security situation in Afghanistan is worsening.

Relations between Kabul and Islamabad are tense.

The peace process with the Taliban is in disarray.

There is a leadership change in Uzbekistan. Radical forces are spreading in the region as shown by suicide bombing at the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan.

Note to understand Pakistan’s ploy in Afghanistan: Pakistan's former ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, whose book Magnificent Delusions is an essential guide, says that "Pakistan has always worried that the natural order of things would be for Afghanistan to come under the sway of India, the giant of the subcontinent. The Pakistani Army came to believe that it could gain leverage in Afghanistan through religious zealots. Afghanistan's secular groups and ethnic nationalists are all suspicious of Pakistan, so the only path in is though those who see a common religious ideology." This strategy is not new, Haqqani points out, noting that funding for such groups began in the mid-1970s, before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

Is there light at the end of the tunnel? Can the insurgency be suppressed? 

The country has a democratically elected government widely viewed as legitimate. Poll after poll has suggested that the Taliban is unpopular. The Afghan army fights fiercely and loyally. And yet the Taliban comes back.

Role of Pakistan: We cannot solve the problems of Afghanistan without recognising that the insurgency against that government is shaped, aided and armed from across the border by one of the world's most powerful armies.

It is an old adage that no counterinsurgency has succeeded when the rebels have had a safe haven.

Taliban leaders have been treated as State guests, but Pakistani leadership has constantly denied these allegations in the face of increasing evidence to the contrary.

Why is it important that India works with Afghanistan to control the situation on ground? 

When the India-hating Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until December 2001, Pakistani militant groups based out of Afghanistan launched frequent cross-border attacks on Kashmir. India was in all kinds of trouble when Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen terrorists hijacked an Indian Airlines flight on 24 December 1999 and took it to Kandahar airport in southern Afghanistan. The eight day hijack drama ended only after India freed three high-profile Kashmiri separatist prisoners.

India’s linkages with & broad objectives in Afghanistan

India’s linkages with Afghanistan
India’s economic, political, and strategic linkages with Afghanistan have improved significantly:

Investments: Indian projects of worth $2 billion have covered various sectors.

Scholarships: Every year 1,500 Afghan students come to India on fellowships.

Military Training: Another 500 training slots are provided to officials.

Defence Equipment Supply: Last year, four Mi25 attack helicopters were supplied to Afghanistan. More military equipment from India could be in the pipeline.

Financial Assistance: An additional $1 billion assistance was committed during the visit in September 2016.

Bilateral Trade: Last year, bilateral was $835 million with more than $300 million exports from Afghanistan to India. For many years, India is the number one export market for Afghan products.

India’s broad objectives in Afghanistan include:

Assist Afghanistan, which is undergoing three simultaneous transitions: Security, Political and Economic.

Ensuring the safety and security of its assets and personnel.

Increasing trade, transit, and energy links with Central Asia through Afghanistan are added objectives.

From low to high, India-Afghanistan relationship has seen it all in the last one year (September, 2015 – September, 2016). Comment

(Author’s Note: The purpose of this question is to clarify in brief as to what has happened since Hamid Karzai stepped down and Ashraf Ghani became the president of Afghanistan. Note that during Karzai regime, India had excellent relations with Afghanistan and had even signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement.)

After President Ashraf Ghani took charge in 2014, he made a decisive shift towards mending fences with the Pakistan Army, including visits to the Pakistan General Headquarters and inviting the Army and intelligence chiefs to Kabul, and signing an MoU between intelligence agencies NDS and ISI, even as his government joined talks with the Taliban hosted by Pakistan.

President Ghani took above steps at a great risk to his popularity – domestically and with India, all in the hope Pakistan would deliver peace. That effort failed spectacularly, undermining his domestic legitimacy. The battered president has turned to India for help.

Not only has President Ghani turned to India for help, but has also unequivocally condemned Pakistan’s use of state sponsored terrorism against India and itself.

What should be India’s guiding principles, so far as getting involved in Afghanistan affairs is concerned?

Close political ties with Kabul, strong goodwill among Afghan citizens and acceptance of India as an important regional player on Afghan matters indicate that India’s aid to Afghanistan has not gone waste.

Moreover even to safeguard our own interests (as outlined above), we must redouble our efforts, and work as follows:

Coordinator of global efforts: Afghanistan is an international project. It is beyond the capacity of New Delhi alone to resolve the serious security and development challenges.

Present hand-holding desirable: However, enhanced Indian engagement at this point will be a big boost to policy-makers in Kabul. In the prevailing negative western discourse on Afghanistan, Indian experts and think-tanks can also help in changing the narrative towards a positive outcome.

Use multilateral/regional groupings to garner support for Afghanistan: The Afghanistan-India-US trilateral dialogue is going to take place in New York soon. Next month, a major international conference on Afghanistan will take place in Brussels. The Heart of Asia Ministerial is taking place in Amritsar on December 4.

With appropriate framework, India can also work out joint projects with other partners.

Security Engagement: In recent months, the news out of the country hasn’t been good: District after district has fallen to the Taliban, with Afghanistan’s 352,000-strong army proving unable to hold ground. India opens itself up to risks by siding with Afghanistan. However, allowing Afghanistan to be overrun by Islamist warlords would impose terrible costs, too. Either way, India appears to be at the cusp of its most significant overseas engagement since Sri Lanka. Each step forward must be measured.

What can India do that looks beyond traditional ways of extending assistance?
(Some novel points)

Can the Indian government get market access to the Afghan fruit industry and dry fruit growers through chartered freight flights that help sell melons, grapes and pomegranates in cities like Delhi and Mumbai?

Can the Indian government help with technological and infrastructural support to the Afghan carpet industry so that its dependence on Pakistan for final finishing process and market reduces?

Lastly, can small Indian businesses be encouraged to set up shops in secured Special Economic Zones that Afghanistan has created in abandoned bases of US and Nato forces?

India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement

The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the two sides, inter alia, provides for assistance to help rebuild:

Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions;

Education and technical assistance to re-build indigenous Afghan capacity in different areas;

Encouraging investment in Afghanistan's natural resources;

Providing duty free access to the Indian market for Afghanistan's exports;

Support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation;

Advocating the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community.

Politico-security component: The agreement states clearly that the strategic partnership is not directed against “any other state or group of states”. India has merely agreed to assist in the “training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan national security forces.”

High Powered Implementation Mechanism: A “Partnership Council” at the Foreign Ministers’ level with four separate joint working groups, on political & security consultations, trade and economic cooperation, capacity development and education, and social cultural & civil society interactions, will be set up. The numerous existing dialogue mechanisms between the two countries will be consolidated and brought under the Partnership Council. The two sides will also have a regular strategic dialogue. The setting up of a Partnership Council will ensure that bilateral relations get sustained attention.



Bibliography


17.09.16: The Afghan Push

20.09.16: Coherence in the neighborhood

25.09.16: India's Afghanistan policy on right track'

29.08.15: India Rebuffs Afghanistan on Strategic Meet

Embassy of India, Kabul, Afghanistan – Webpage



Thursday, September 22

INDUS WATER TREATY: Should India Dissolve it?


INDUS WATER TREATY: Should India 

Dissolve it?



UPSC General Studies: Paper I & II

"If the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water -- unless we change our approach to managing this precious and vital resource."
Ismail Serageldin
(Ismail Serageldin is the Founding Director of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina (BA), the new Library of Alexandria, inaugurated in 2002. He also chairs the Boards of Directors for each of the BA's affiliated research institutes and museums. He is advisor to the Egyptian Prime Minister in matters concerning culture, science and museums. Serageldin has been one of the most important voices calling for attention to the issues of water. In August 1995 he gave the above warning.)

Table of Content
Brief History of Origin of Indus Water Treaty
1947-1960: How was water distribution taking place?
Provisions of Indus Water Treaty 1960
What could have been the logic of signing the treaty in 1960? Does that logic still hold?
Should India dissolve the IWT?
Impact of IWT on J&K
Associated Issue (Perspective on Development of Indus Basin)


Signing of IWT at Karachi: (L to R) Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, and Mr. W.A.B. Illif of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960.



Brief History of Origin of Indus Water Treaty


Partition right across Indus Basin: At the time of independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian state.

Irrigation Concerns: Moreover, two important irrigation head works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan) had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian territory.

Signing of the Treaty: A dispute thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.

The Treaty was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and Mr. W.A.B. Illif of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960.


1974-1960: How was water distribution taking place?


During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned by the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the government of Pakistan.

The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent solution.

Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. From the Indian point of view, there was nothing that Pakistan could do to prevent India from any of the schemes to divert the flow of water in the rivers.

Pakistan’s position was dismal and India could do whatever it wanted. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution. 


Provisions of Indus Water Treaty 1960


Eastern & Western Rivers: The Indus system of rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej and their tributaries) and three Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab and their tributaries).

Allocation to India: Under the Treaty, the waters of Eastern Rivers are allocated to India. India is under obligation to let flow the waters of the Western Rivers except for the following uses: (a) Domestic Use, (b) Non-consumptive use, (c) Agricultural use as specified, (d) Generation of hydro-electric power as specified.

Provide info to Pak.: India is under obligation to supply information of its storage and hydroelectric projects as specified.

Storage Construction: India has been permitted to construct storage of water on Western Rivers upto 3.6 MAF for various purposes. No storage has been developed so far.

Setup of Permanent Indus Commission: Under the Treaty, India and Pakistan have each created a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters. They together constitute the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), which is entrusted with the implementation of the Treaty. The PIC is required to hold meetings and tours and submit report on its work to the two Governments every year.

Exchange of Info: Both sides are required to exchange information related to river flows observed by them, not later than three months of their observation and to exchange specified information on Agricultural Use every year.

Flood Data: India communicates as a gesture of goodwill, flood data to Pakistan from 1st July to 10th October every year, to enable them to undertake advance flood relief measures. The arrangement is reviewed every year.

Word on the working of IWT:

While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.

The Permanent Indus Commission has survived three wars and provides an ongoing mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data and visits.


What could have been the logic of signing the treaty in 1960? 

Does that logic still hold?



Water for Peace: In 1960, India thought it was trading water for peace by signing the treaty. Within five years of the treaty’s entry into force, Pakistan launched a war to grab the Indian part of J&K in 1965.

Vienna Convention on LoT: Pakistan insists on rights without responsibilities. In fact, its use of state-reared terrorist groups can be invoked by India, under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as constituting reasonable grounds for withdrawal from the Indus treaty.

ICJ Rulings: The International Court of Justice has upheld the principle that a treaty may be dissolved by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances.

Pakistan’s misuse of IWT: In more recent years, Pakistan has also found novel ways to turn the IWT into a weapon against India. Pakistan has for over a decade now been pursuing a "water war" strategy against India. This strategy centres on repeatedly invoking the IWT's conflict-resolution provisions to "internationalize" any perceived disagreement so as to mount pressure on India. In its latest move to corner India, Pakistan has initiated steps to haul it before a seven-member international arbitral tribunal in The Hague for pursuing two hydropower projects in J&K.

Given that Pakistan continues to harm India's interests, technically can call the treaty to be null and void.


Should India dissolve the IWT?


Inference from China’s treatment of ICJ ruling: What China did recently — publicly trash an arbitral tribunal ruling that found it has no legal or historical basis to claim most of the South China Sea — was not an isolated case: major powers rarely go for international arbitration or accept arbitral tribunal awards.

India can follow suit: In the absence of an enforcement mechanism in international law, nothing can stop India from emulating the example of the major powers.

Hold out the threat: The Indus is Pakistan's jugular vein. If India wishes to improve Pakistan's behaviour and dissuade it from exporting more terrorists, it should hold out a credible threat of dissolving the IWT, drawing a clear linkage between Pakistan's right to unimpeded water inflows and its responsibility not to cause harm to its upper riparian.


Why we should not do it:

Strategically ill advised: It would be detrimental to India’s interests in the long run. There is already strong discomfort in Pakistan with the fact that India controls its rivers. This despite the fact that India has always complied with the provisions of the Treaty. In fact, the eagerness in a section of Pakistani society to wrest Kashmir originates in the desire to take control of its rivers. Any tinkering with the Treaty is likely to see an intensification of Pak-backed activities in J&K.

Geographically catastrophic: Waters cannot be immediately stopped from flowing to Pakistan unless we are ready to inundate our own cities. Srinagar, Jammu and every other city in the state and in Punjab would get flooded if we somehow were able to prevent the waters from flowing into Pakistan.

Diplomatically untenable: We have water-sharing arrangements with other neighbours as well. Not honouring the Indus Treaty would make them uneasy and distrustful. And we would lose our voice if China, decides to do something similar.


What should be done?


Use our share of Western Rivers: Under the Treaty, we can make use of the waters of the western rivers for irrigation, storage, and even for producing electricity, in the manner specified. If we just do what we are entitled to under the Treaty, it would be enough to send jitters through Pakistan. It would be a strong signal without doing anything drastic.



Impact of IWT on J&K


Given that water is J&K’s main natural resource and essential for economic development, the gifting of its river waters to Pakistan by treaty has fostered popular grievance there.

Resolution in J&K Legislature: Demands in the J&K legislature for revision or abrogation of the Indus treaty are growing since a resolution seeking a treaty review was passed in 2003.

Estimation of economic losses to J&K: The J&K government in 2011 hired an international consultant to assess the State’s cumulative economic losses, estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually, from the treaty-imposed fetters on water utilization.

Indian govt’s effort stymied by Pakistan: The backlash from underdevelopment, made worse by a Pakistan-abetted insurrection, has prompted New Delhi to embark on several modestly sized, run-of-the-river hydropower projects in J&K to address chronic electricity shortages. Run-of-the-river projects are permitted by the Indus treaty within defined limits. But Pakistan wants no Indian works on the three “western rivers” and seeks international intercession by invoking the treaty’s dispute-settlement provisions, which permit a neutral-expert assessment or the constitution of a seven-member arbitral tribunal. By aiming to deny J&K the limited benefits permissible under the treaty, Pakistan wishes to further its strategy to foment discontent and violence there. (Example: Kishenganga HEP Project)

India must act before it loses the right on river-water use: Today, Pakistan’s water relationship with India is becoming murkier due to China’s construction of dams in Pakistan-held Kashmir. While railing against India’s small-sized projects, Pakistan is pursuing mega-dams, such as the 7,000-megawatt Bunji Dam and the 4,500-megawatt Bhasha Dam. By way of comparison, the biggest dam India has built since Independence is the 2,000-megawatt Tehri project in Uttarakhand. With Indian work suspended, this must be seen as a bid to stake a priority right on river-water use.


Associated Issue

Another Perspective on Development of Indus Basin

While the IWT has broadly taken care of the water sharing aspect and the bilateral differences in the engineering-technical realm resolved within the aegis of the treaty, time has come to consider a mutually agreed Indus Basin water management endeavor between India and Pakistan.

The geo-physical and ecological conditions in the Indus Basin today is substantially different vis-à-vis that of the early 1950s and 1960 when the landmark treaty was concluded.

It will be unfair to ignore the present water needs of the riparian provinces of both the countries, which basically implies those of J & K, Punjab provinces of India and Pakistan,  Sind  and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (and also of Rajasthan as a subsequent beneficiary province).

Such an approach will also help de- politicize the political-cum-public grievance in J & K on the constraining impact of the IWT on economic development of the State. A water management inter-river basin approach within the Indus system, may not involve a re-drafting of the IWT.

Additional protocols only will be required, in a step-by-step manner, to augment the water-generation in the catchment areas and optimally organize the resultant flows.

A level of mutual confidence and down-playing the security perceptions between India and Pakistan, will be a sine qua non, for above-referred impetus to succeed. It may be worthwhile to recall observations of David Lilienthal, former Chief of Tennessee Valley Authority, in February 1951 that India and Pakistan should work out a programme jointly to develop and augment the Indus River Basin System.

As practical necessity, in the interest of peace and security of the sub-continent and welfare of the people of India and Pakistan, both the Govt. of India and the State Govt. of J & K should work with a larger perspective of inter-Indus Basin management, while compensating the State for the power constraint suffered, for a specified period in the immediate future.