INDUS WATER
TREATY: Should India
Dissolve it?
UPSC
General Studies: Paper I & II
"If the wars of this
century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over
water -- unless we change our approach to managing this precious and vital
resource."
Ismail Serageldin
(Ismail Serageldin is the
Founding Director of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina (BA), the new Library of
Alexandria, inaugurated in 2002. He also chairs the Boards of Directors for
each of the BA's affiliated research institutes and museums. He is advisor to
the Egyptian Prime Minister in matters concerning culture, science and museums.
Serageldin has been one of the most important voices calling for attention to
the issues of water. In August 1995 he gave the above warning.)
Table of
Content
Brief History of Origin of Indus Water Treaty
1947-1960: How was water distribution taking place?
Provisions of Indus Water Treaty 1960
What could have been the logic of signing the treaty in 1960? Does that
logic still hold?
Should India dissolve the IWT?
Impact of IWT on J&K
Associated Issue (Perspective on Development of Indus Basin)
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Signing of IWT at
Karachi: (L to R) Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, Field
Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, and Mr. W.A.B.
Illif of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960.
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Brief History of Origin of Indus
Water Treaty
Partition right across Indus Basin: At the time of
independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent
countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin,
leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian state.
Irrigation Concerns: Moreover, two important
irrigation head works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur
on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan)
had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian territory.
Signing of the Treaty: A dispute thus arose
between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from
existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing
of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.
The Treaty was signed at Karachi by
Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, Shri
Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and Mr. W.A.B. Illif of the
World Bank on 19th September, 1960.
1974-1960: How was water distribution taking place?
During the first years of partition
the waters of the Indus were apportioned by the Inter-Dominion
Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India
to release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in
return for annual payments from the government
of Pakistan.
The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent solution.
Neither side, however, was willing to
compromise their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate.
From the Indian point of view, there was nothing that Pakistan could do to
prevent India from any of the schemes to divert the flow of water in the
rivers.
Pakistan’s position was dismal and
India could do whatever it wanted. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the
International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict
required a bilateral resolution.
Provisions of Indus Water Treaty 1960
Eastern & Western Rivers: The Indus system of
rivers comprises three Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas and
Sutlej and their tributaries) and three Western
Rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab and their tributaries).
Allocation to India: Under the Treaty, the
waters of Eastern Rivers are allocated to India.
India is under obligation to let flow the waters of the Western Rivers except for the following uses: (a) Domestic Use, (b) Non-consumptive
use, (c) Agricultural use as specified,
(d) Generation of hydro-electric power as
specified.
Provide info to Pak.: India is under obligation
to supply information of its storage and hydroelectric
projects as specified.
Storage Construction: India has been permitted
to construct storage of water on Western Rivers upto
3.6 MAF for various purposes. No storage has been developed so far.
Setup of Permanent Indus Commission: Under the Treaty, India and Pakistan have each created a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus Waters. They
together constitute the Permanent Indus Commission
(PIC), which is entrusted with the implementation
of the Treaty. The PIC is required to hold meetings
and tours and submit report on its work to the two Governments every year.
Exchange of Info: Both sides are required
to exchange information related to river flows observed by them, not later than
three months of their observation and to exchange specified information on
Agricultural Use every year.
Flood Data: India communicates as a gesture of goodwill, flood data to Pakistan from 1st
July to 10th October every year, to enable them to undertake
advance flood relief measures. The arrangement is reviewed every year.
Word on the working of IWT:
While neither side has initiated
projects that could cause the kind of conflict that the Commission was created
to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data
continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.
The Permanent Indus Commission has survived three wars and provides an ongoing mechanism for consultation and conflict resolution through
inspection, exchange of data and visits.
What could have been the logic of
signing the treaty in 1960?
Does that logic still hold?
Water for Peace: In 1960, India thought it
was trading water for peace by signing the treaty.
Within five years of the treaty’s entry into force, Pakistan launched a war to
grab the Indian part of J&K in 1965.
Vienna Convention on LoT: Pakistan insists on rights without responsibilities. In fact, its use of state-reared terrorist groups can be invoked by India,
under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, as constituting reasonable grounds for
withdrawal from the Indus treaty.
ICJ Rulings: The International Court
of Justice has upheld the principle that a treaty may be dissolved by reason of
a fundamental change of circumstances.
Pakistan’s misuse of IWT: In more recent years,
Pakistan has also found novel ways to turn the IWT into a weapon against India.
Pakistan has for over a decade now been pursuing a "water
war" strategy against India. This strategy centres on repeatedly invoking the IWT's conflict-resolution provisions
to "internationalize" any perceived
disagreement so as to mount pressure on India. In its latest move to
corner India, Pakistan has initiated steps to haul it before a seven-member
international arbitral tribunal in The Hague for pursuing two hydropower projects in J&K.
Given that Pakistan continues to harm
India's interests, technically can call the treaty to be null and void.
Should
India dissolve the IWT?
Inference from China’s treatment of
ICJ ruling: What China did recently — publicly trash an
arbitral tribunal ruling that found it has no legal or historical basis
to claim most of the South China Sea — was not an isolated case: major powers
rarely go for international arbitration or accept arbitral tribunal awards.
India can follow suit: In the absence of an enforcement mechanism in international law,
nothing can stop India from emulating the example of the major powers.
Hold out the threat: The Indus is Pakistan's jugular vein. If India wishes to
improve Pakistan's behaviour and dissuade it from
exporting more terrorists, it should hold out a credible
threat of dissolving the IWT, drawing a clear linkage between Pakistan's
right to unimpeded water inflows and its responsibility not to cause harm to
its upper riparian.
Why we should not do it:
Strategically ill advised: It would be detrimental to India’s interests in the
long run. There is already strong discomfort in Pakistan with the fact that
India controls its rivers. This despite the fact that India has always complied
with the provisions of the Treaty. In fact, the eagerness in a section of
Pakistani society to wrest Kashmir originates in the desire to take control of
its rivers. Any tinkering with the Treaty is likely to see an intensification
of Pak-backed activities in J&K.
Geographically catastrophic: Waters cannot be immediately
stopped from flowing to Pakistan unless we are ready to inundate our own
cities. Srinagar, Jammu and every other city in the state and in Punjab would
get flooded if we somehow were able to prevent the waters from flowing into
Pakistan.
What should be done?
Use our share of Western Rivers:
Under the Treaty, we can make use of the waters of the western rivers for
irrigation, storage, and even for producing electricity, in the manner
specified. If we just do what we are entitled to under the Treaty, it would be enough
to send jitters through Pakistan. It would be a strong signal without
doing anything drastic.
Impact of
IWT on J&K
Given that water
is J&K’s main natural resource and essential for economic
development, the gifting of its river waters to
Pakistan by treaty has fostered popular grievance there.
Resolution in J&K Legislature: Demands in the J&K
legislature for revision or abrogation of the Indus treaty are growing since a resolution seeking a treaty review was passed in 2003.
Estimation of economic losses to
J&K: The J&K government in 2011 hired an international
consultant to assess the State’s cumulative economic losses, estimated
to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually, from the treaty-imposed fetters
on water utilization.
Indian govt’s effort stymied by
Pakistan: The backlash from underdevelopment, made worse by a Pakistan-abetted
insurrection, has prompted New Delhi to embark on several modestly sized, run-of-the-river hydropower projects in J&K to address
chronic electricity shortages. Run-of-the-river projects are permitted
by the Indus treaty within defined limits. But Pakistan
wants no Indian works on the three “western rivers” and seeks
international intercession by invoking the treaty’s dispute-settlement
provisions, which permit a neutral-expert assessment or the constitution of a seven-member
arbitral tribunal. By aiming to deny J&K the limited benefits permissible
under the treaty, Pakistan wishes to further its strategy
to foment discontent and violence there. (Example: Kishenganga HEP Project)
India must act before it loses the
right on river-water use: Today, Pakistan’s water relationship with India is becoming
murkier due to China’s construction of dams in
Pakistan-held Kashmir. While railing against India’s small-sized
projects, Pakistan is pursuing mega-dams, such
as the 7,000-megawatt Bunji Dam and the 4,500-megawatt Bhasha Dam. By way of comparison, the biggest
dam India has built since Independence is the 2,000-megawatt
Tehri project in Uttarakhand. With Indian work suspended, this must be
seen as a bid to stake a priority right on river-water
use.
Associated
Issue
Another Perspective on Development of
Indus Basin
While the IWT has broadly taken care
of the water sharing aspect and the bilateral differences in the
engineering-technical realm resolved within the aegis of the treaty, time has
come to consider a mutually agreed Indus Basin water
management endeavor between India and Pakistan.
The geo-physical
and ecological conditions in the Indus Basin today is substantially different vis-à-vis that of the early
1950s and 1960 when the landmark treaty was concluded.
It will be unfair
to ignore the present water needs of the riparian provinces of both the
countries, which basically implies those of J & K, Punjab provinces
of India and Pakistan, Sind and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (and also of
Rajasthan as a subsequent beneficiary province).
Such an approach will also help de- politicize the political-cum-public grievance in J &
K on the constraining impact of the IWT on economic development of the
State. A water management inter-river basin approach within
the Indus system, may not involve a re-drafting of the IWT.
Additional protocols only
will be required, in a step-by-step manner, to augment the water-generation in the
catchment areas and optimally organize the resultant flows.
A level of mutual
confidence and down-playing the security
perceptions between India and Pakistan, will be a sine qua non, for
above-referred impetus to succeed. It may be worthwhile to recall observations
of David Lilienthal, former Chief of Tennessee
Valley Authority, in February 1951 that India and Pakistan should work out a programme jointly to develop and augment the Indus
River Basin System.
As practical necessity, in the
interest of peace and security of the sub-continent and welfare of the people
of India and Pakistan, both the Govt. of India and the State Govt. of J & K
should work with a larger perspective of inter-Indus Basin management, while compensating the State for the power constraint suffered,
for a specified period in the immediate future.
