43. Theatre Command
Issue
Joint operations vs
integrated command: Understanding a new way to fight wars
o
A committee appointed by the Defence Ministry
has recommended creating 3 integrated
theatre commands of the Indian armed forces —northern, western and southern —
instead of the 17 in place currently.
o
The three integrated theatre commands — northern for the China border, western for
the Pakistan border and southern for the maritime role.
o
It is expected to enhance the combat potential
of the armed forces and to re-balance defence expenditure.
o
The concept of necking down India's many
operational commands into four to five theatre commands under one theatre
commander has been discussed since 1999.
o
Many committees have strongly recommended it.
The Subrahmanyam Committee set up after
the Kargil War also recommended restructuring of the armed forces.
What is an integrated theatre command?
o
An integrated theatre command envisages a unified command of the three
Services, under a single commander, for geographical theatres that are of
security concern.
o
The commander of such a force will be able to
bring to bear all resources at his
disposal — from the IAF, the Army and the Navy — with seamless efficacy.
o
The integrated theatre commander will not be
answerable to individual Services, and will be free to train, equip and exercise his command to make it a cohesive
fighting force capable of achieving designated goals.
o
The logistic
resources required to support his operations will also be placed at the
disposal of the theatre commander so that he does not have to look for
anything when operations are ongoing.
o
This is in contrast to the model of
service-specific commands which India currently has, wherein the Army, Air
Force and Navy all have their own commands all over the country.
o
In case
of war, each Service Chief is expected to control the operations of his Service
through individual commands, while they operate jointly.
Does India have an integrated theatre command anywhere in
its area?
Ø
Andaman
and Nicobar Command(ANC)
o
Only one, which is the ANC. It was formed in
2001, following the Group of Ministers’ report on national security, after the
Kargil War.
o
It is a very small command, with limited resources, and there has been a demand to
revert the control of command permanently to the Navy.
Ø
Strategic
Forces Command (SFC)
o
The other tri-service command, the SFC, looks
after the delivery and operational control of the country’s nuclear assets.
o
It was created in 2003, but because it has no specific geographic responsibility and a
designated role, it is not an integrated theatre command but an integrated
functional command.
o
There has
been a demand for other integrated functional commands, such as the cyber,
aerospace and Special Operations commands, but the government is yet to approve
any.
Arguments for an Integrated Command
Ø
Modern
War and army
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One, modern warfare, which is driven by
technology, has transformed in two ways.
o
Instead
of linear battlefields (either air-land, or air-sea), there are now six battlefields whose optimisation would
determine the war outcome. These are land,
air, sea, space, cyber and electronic.
o
Given these disparate battlefields, the Chinese focus has shifted to non-contact
war with limited or no loss of lives to own troops.
o
Given this situation, in India, the air force
and not the army would lead the land war.
Ø
Unity of
Command
o
Modern warfare is all about speed, concerted
action and mobility and optimally sequenced and synchronised use of force by
deploying all assets in a planned manner is critical and can only be achieved
by unity of command.
o
The requirement
for single point control and responsibility of forces engaged in combat is
inescapable, and there is no better person to perform this task than a theatre
commander charged with the responsibility of fighting and winning a war
against an adversary.
Ø
Practical
Advantage
o
Having officers of equivalent ranks from
different services commanding their own forces and responsible for battle in
one geographical area is an outdated concept.
o
For
instance, in eastern (including northeastern) India, in the event of a conflict
with our neighbour (China), the army's
eastern command commander-in-chief (C-in-C) and the IAF’s eastern command
C-in-C have to work as one.
o
That will not happen and all serious decision making, especially about deployment of air assets,
will have to be referred to the army and air headquarters in Delhi.
o
In the
heat of the battle, differences between the two services will inevitably crop
up and that can very seriously affect our effectiveness. Hence, a theatre command with one commander is the
need of the hour.
Ø
Difference
of Opinion
o
In actual battles, turf wars, egos and differences of perceptions as well as the narrow
need to preserve the interests of their respective services crop up among even
among the senior most officers.
o
A theatre
commander with supreme authority in one theatre is the answer. We have to migrate to the one front, one
commander format.
o
In a real conflict, decisions need to be taken very fast and that can happen only when you
have one commander in one theatre.
Ø
Viewpoint
of Army
o
The Army believesthat the armed forces need to move away from a “service specific approach to
operations towards a system which avoids duplication, ensures optimum
utilisation of available resources, brings
in greater jointness, leads to timely and mature decisions to developing
situations and ensures flawless execution of orders to achieve success in
battle”.
Ø
Insufficient
resources of IAF
o
IAF assets,
including special weapons, are limited in number and are distributed across the
country, which require base-installation support.
o
It is not possible to triplicate or quadruplicate
them to every Theatre Command.
o
Same is the case with skilled personnel and EW
(electronic warfare) and C4ISR (command,
control, computers, communications, intelligence and reconnaissance)
equipment.
o
Moreover, the IAF has a serious shortfall in strength of combat squadrons
o
It
believes that India is not
geographically large enough to be divided into different theatres, as
resources from one theatre can easily be moved to another theatre.
Ø
Current
Model ideally suited for Navy
o
The Navy
considers the current model of control by the Navy Headquarters ideally suited
for its strategic role.
o
There are also underlying fears about the smaller Services losing their autonomy and
importance. The Services are aware that 4-star ranks will be reduced if the
current system is to be replaced by 3 commands.
Ø
Operational
Chaos
o
In the present system, the three service chiefs sitting in Delhi are the highest
operational commanders (who are directly involved in war-fighting).
o
Next, the
commanders of the 19 different commands
(referred to as commander-in-chief) are the highest operational commanders in
their areas of responsibility.
o
In all
previous conventional wars fought by India, a perennial problem has been the interference of service chiefs in the
domains of concerned commanders-in-chief in how to run the war; this has led to
confusion and undermining of authority.
o
Now, by adding
another layer in the form of joint theatre commander, there would be three
operational commanders.That would lead to further operational chaos.
Ø
Increase
in Expenditure
o
In this present scenario, forming Theatre
Commands would demand large increase in
expenditure with doubtful returns.
o
Before we embark on a new organisation, the government must evaluate the efficacy
of the current Integrated Defence Headquarters including the two joint commands
— the Strategic Forces Command and ANC (Andaman and Nicobar Command).
o
The core
issue to be addressed when considering the Theatre Command is whether the current structure helps the
Services to coordinate and mount joint operations effectively.
Prerequisites for
Theatre Command
Ø
Phased
manner
o
The move towards integrating the different services commands into unified theatre
commands has to be carried out in a phased manner.
o
First
phase
§
In the first phase, he said, the AORs (Area of
Responsibility)of the different commands of the three services should be
redrawn to make them collinear and correspond to each other.
o
Second
Phase
§
In the second phase, the headquarters of the regional commands of the three services should be
co-located.
§
For
instance, the eastern army, navy and air
force command headquarters should ideally be Kolkata. The army's southern
command HQ at Pune should be moved further south to co-locate it ideally with
the navy's southern command HQ at Cochin and the same ought to be done to the
IAF southern command HQ, which is now at Thiruvananthapuram.
§
Such
co-location has to be rational: in the south, the navy will have a major role
to play since peninsular India is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal and Arabian
Sea on two sides and the Indian Ocean in its south.
o
Third
Phase
§
The third and final phase would be the integration of the services into unified
theatre commands.
o
All this has to be done within strict timelines in order to ensure that the process is not
delayed or derailed.
Ø
What else
is required
o
Along with moving towards theatre commands,
there are many other things that need to be done.
o
There has to be, greater integration between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the
services headquarters.
o
India is
the only major democracy where the service headquarters (the headquarters of
the army, navy and air force) are away from the MoD, which has no presence of uniformed officers and is manned
exclusively by civilians who have little or no knowledge of defence matters.
o
The three service chiefs are operational
commanders instead of being chiefs of staff to the Defence Minister and the
Prime Minister.
Ø
Self
sufficiency in defence
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India has to urgently move towards self-sufficiency in defence hardware.
o
India's
armed forces are short of personnel, equipment and firepower.
o
The Army
needs artillery guns and reliable rifles for its infantry. The Navy requires more submarines as
replacements for its ageing fleet. The IAF is woefully short of fighter
aircraft. We should have at least 45 frontline squadrons, but the current
strength is around 30 squadrons.
o
War
waging reserves (WWR) are running low and we need more aircrew.
o
India imports 75 per cent of its war weaponry and energy needs, inflow of which will
become uncertain if sanctions or embargoes are imposed in the event of hostilities.
Ø
Functional
Command
o
A beginning can be made.
o
Space,
cyber and C4ISR could be the functional commands where the three services are
integrated.
o
The Integrated
Defence Staff should be the focal point for threat assessment, budget
allocation and procurement.
o
With the experience gained and when the
situation is more favourable, India could move to form theatre commands.
International Scenario
Ø
USA
o
The USA
was the first nation to adopt the theatre command concept as part of a policy
that encompassed the entire globe.
o
These
‘unified combat commands’ are organised either on geographical basis with a
defined mission in a specific ‘area of responsibility’ somewhere on the globe
or on a ‘functional’ basis.
o
The USA
has six geographical combat commands and four functional commands
comprising cyber command, special operations command, strategic command and
transportation command.
o
Each
combat command is fully equipped with necessary resources of land forces, air
assets, naval vessels and Marine Corps elements.
o
They have
integral C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and can seek assistance from
any of the functional commands when required.
o
They can conduct military operations independently.
Each combat command has one commander - he or she could be from any service -
who reports directly to the President of the USA through the Defence Secretary.
Ø
CHINA
o
There have been media reports about the Indian
military reorganising itself into integrated ‘theatre commands’ as opposed to
the current system of ‘individual service regional commands’.
o
The trigger
for this proposed change could be the Chinese military creating five theatre
commands, replacing the earlier seven ‘military regions’ in 2016 as part of
the military reform that began in 2015.
o
China has successfully pursued a long-term comprehensive transformation of
its military forces to improve its capabilities in power projection,
anti-access and area denial.
o
China has laid down a time-bound three-step
developmental strategy in modernising its national defence:
i.
Lay a
solid foundation by 2010.
ii.
Make major
progress by 2020.
iii.
Achieve strategic
goal of building ‘informatised’ (net-centric warfare enabled) armed forces
capable of winning wars by 2050.
o
The change to theatre commands is part of this
long-term policy.
o
China
waited till its military arsenal and defence production capability reached
self-sufficiency.
o
China is
not dependent on any other country for its military requirement. In fact, it is
exporting high-end military products to many Asian and African nations.
Comparison
o
The USA
spends $620 billion (3.5 per cent of its GDP) on the military while China’s
military expenditure is $220 billion (2.3 per cent of its GDP).
o
India spends
only about $ 60 billion on defence, which is less than 2 per cent of its
GDP.
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