UPSC: India USA Relations (Part 2)

1. No longer seeing eye to eye?

07.06.18 TH Opinion

At his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last week, billed as a major foreign policy statement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of India and the U.S.’s “shared vision” of an open and secure Indo-Pacific region. Yet his words differed so much from those of U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis, who spoke at the same event, that it seemed clear that New Delhi and Washington no longer see eye-to-eye on this issue, and several others as well.

Oceanic gulf

INDO-PACIFIC A NATURAL OR A STRATEGIC REGION? To begin with, Mr. Modi referred to the Indo-Pacific , a term coined by the U.S. for the Indian and Pacific Oceans region, as a natural geographical region, not a strategic one, while Mr. Mattis called the Indo-Pacific a “priority theatre” and a “subset of [America’s] broader security strategy” for his military command, now renamed the Indo-Pacific Command.

RUSSIA AND CHINA FRIENDS OR FOES? While Mr. Modi referred to India’s good relations with the U.S., Russia and China in equal measure, Mr. Mattis vowed to counter China’s moves in the Indo-Pacific, and referred to the U.S. National Defence Strategy released this January, which puts both China and Russia in its crosshairs as the world’s two “revisionist powers” .

INDIA’S CHANGED POSTURE VIS A VIS CHINA: The divergence in their positions, admittedly, are due more to a shift in New Delhi’s position over the past year than in the U.S.’s, when Mr. Modi and President Donald Trump met at the White House. A year ago, the Modi government seemed clear in its intention to counter China’s growing clout in its neighbourhood, especially post-Doklam, challenge the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and back a Quadrilateral grouping of India, the U.S., Japan and Australia to maintain an open Indo-Pacific. Today, the Doklam issue has been buried, the BRI isn’t as much a concern as before, and the government’s non-confrontational attitude to the Maldives and Nepal indicates a softened policy on China in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, Mr. Modi now essays a closer engagement with Chinese President Xi Jinping and a relationship reset with China after the Wuhan meeting.

INDIA NOT KEEN ON MILITARISING QUAD: The Quad formation, which is holding its second official meeting today in Singapore, has also been given short shrift. India rejected an Australian request to join maritime exercises along with the U.S. and Japan this June, and Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba said quite plainly last month that there was no plan to “militarise” the Quad .

INDIA JOINS SCO: Contrast this with India’s acceptance of military exercises with countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Russia-China led grouping it will join this week in Qingdao, and one can understand some of the confusion in Washington.

INDIA DEFIES DIKTATS ON IRAN/VENEZUELA: Pentagon officials, who had come to accept India’s diffidence on signing outstanding India-U.S. foundational agreements, are now left scratching their heads as India publicly enters the international arena in the corner with Russia and China, while proclaiming its intention to continue energy deals with Iran and Venezuela in defiance of American sanctions.

Era of summits

INDIA’S SUMMITRY WITH RUSSIA/CHINA IN HIGH GEAR: In a world where summits between leaders have replaced grand strategy, the optics are even clearer. Mr. Modi will have met Mr. Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin four-five times each by the end of the year, if one counts informal and formal summits, as well as meetings at the SCO, BRICS and G-20. In contrast, nearly half the year has gone in just scheduling the upcoming 2+2 meet of Indian and U.S. Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

FLASHPOINTS IN AREA OF TRADE AND COMMERCE: Trade protectionism is clearly the other big point of divergence between India and the U.S., which have in recent months taken each other to the World Trade Organisation on several issues. There has been a surge in disputes between the two countries: on the new American steel and aluminium tariffs, the proposed cuts in H1B professional visas and cancellation of H4 spouse visas , on India’s tariffs and resistance to U.S. exports of dairy and pork products, on Indian price reductions on medical devices , and Reserve Bank of India rules on data localisation on Indian servers for U.S. companies.

The row over Harley-Davidson motorcycles is a case in point, where what should have been a small chink in the relationship has ended up denting the discourse quite seriously. When Mr. Trump announced to Harley executives and union representatives in February last year that he would stop countries “taking advantage” of them, no one in New Delhi paid much attention. Over the year, Mr. Trump grew more vocal in this demand, including twice during meetings with Mr. Modi in Washington and Manila, calling for India to scrap its 75-100% tariffs, given that the U.S. imposes zero tariffs on the import of Indian Royal Enfield motorcycles. Mr. Modi tried to accommodate U.S. concerns, and even called Mr. Trump on February 8 this year to tell him that tariffs were about to be cut to 50%. But after Mr. Trump divulged the contents of their conversation publicly, trade talks were driven into a rut. Officials in Washington still say that if India were to slash its rates, it would see major benefits in other areas of commerce, while officials in New Delhi say that with Mr. Trump having gone public with Mr. Modi’s offer, it would be impossible to back down any further. In fact, a new cess has taken tariffs back up to 70%.

US TARGETTING OF RUSSIA AND IRAN DETRIMENTAL FOR INDIA: The biggest challenges to a common India-U.S. vision are now emerging from the new U.S. law called Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act and the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal with the threat of more secondary sanctions. Both actions have a direct impact on India, given its high dependence on defence hardware from Russia and its considerable energy interests in Iran. In particular, India’s plans to acquire the Russian S-400 missile system will become the litmus test of whether India and the U.S. can resolve their differences. Clearly the differences over a big ticket deal like this should have been sorted out long before the decisions were made; yet there is no indication that the Trump administration and the Modi government took each other into confidence before doing so.

In the face of sanctions

INDIA’S STAND CLEAR: Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s avowal of the S-400 agreement, and Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s open defiance of U.S. sanctions on Russia, Iran and Venezuela at separate press conferences this month couldn’t have helped.

It also didn’t help that owing to Mr. Trump’s sudden decision to sack Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State in March, the 2+2 meeting in April, which may have clarified matters, was put off. The truth is, building a relationship with the Trump administration in the past year has been tricky for both South Block and the Indian Embassy in Washington, as more than 30 key administration officials have quit or have been sacked — they have had to deal with three National Security Advisers, two Chiefs of Staff, as well as two Secretaries of State as interlocutors.

It is equally clear that the India-U.S. equation isn’t balancing out quite the way it did last year, when Mr. Modi and Mr. Trump first announced the idea of the “2+2” dialogue. Ms. Swaraj, Ms. Sitharaman and their American counterparts have their work cut out for them during their upcoming meeting in Washington on July 6. If a week is a long time in politics, in geopolitics today a year is an eternity.

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in

XXX

2. The sanctions shadow

16.06.18 IT

2+2 DIALOGUE TO START BETWEEN USA AND INDIA; RUSSIA AN IMPORTANT FACTOR TO CONSIDER: When foreign minister Sushma Swaraj and defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman travel to Washington next month for the first of the annual '2+2' strategic dialogue with their respective US counterparts Mike Pompeo and Jim Mattis, they will have Russia on their mind. Specifically, how to insulate Indias military preparedness from the threat of US sanctions, which has hung a sword of Damocles over the country's military ties with Russia.

CAATSA IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON IRAN, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA AS WELL AS COUNTRIES BUYING ARMS FROM THEM: In January, the US law CAATSA (Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) came into effect. The law imposes sanctions on Russia, North Korea and Iran as well as countries buying arms from them.

SANCTIONS AFTER CRIMEA LIMITED ONLY TO RUSSIA; CAATSA EXTENDS THEM TO BUYERS PROCURING FROM RUSSIA: A senior government official says while the sanctions imposed after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 focused only on Russian firms, CAATSA shifts the US attack to foreign countries doing business with all Russian military firms. This has serious implications for India, one of Russia's largest defence partners for nearly 50 years. It not only needs spare parts for warships, fighter jets, radars and battle tanks that now make up nearly 60 per cent of its weaponry, the sanctions impact arms deals worth over $12 billion that the Indian armed forces are seeking to counter China and Pakistan.

ALL 3 ARMS OF MILITARY DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA FOR MODERNISATION: The navy has recently negotiated the lease of a second nuclear-powered attack submarine from Russia for $2 billion. The amount will pay for the lease and refit of a Russian navy Akula-2 hull, which is to join the navy in the next decade to replace INS Chakra, which was leased from Russia in 2008. The army needs to urgently replace its ageing fleet of Cheetah and Chetak helicopters with Kamov 226 light utility helicopters , 140 of which will be manufactured in India as a joint venture between Russian Helicopters and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The Indian Air Force wants five S-400 surface-to-air missile systems worth over Rs 40,000 crore from Russia to significantly offset the disadvantages of its depleted fighter squadrons when facing the air forces of China and Pakistan in case of a two-front war. Each missile has a range of nearly 400 km. When deployed on the border, they can cover vast reaches of Pakistan's airspace (the US-made Patriot PAC-3 missile has a range of just 70 km).

S-400 TRIMUPH SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEM WILL BE A TEST CASE: All of these deals will see significant currency transactions, which are likely to attract provisions of CAATSA, but given Indias financial constraints, the deal for S-400 missiles seems closest to the finish line. The S-400 contract is likely to be signed when President Vladimir Putin visits India later this year for the 19th Annual India-Russia bilateral summit. This one deal will thus be the test case of the Indian government's ability to withstand United States sanctions, particularly since the US regards this particular missile system with deep suspicion.

USA SAYS INTER-OPERABILITY WILL BE HAMPERED IF ANY PARTNER PROCURES S-400: On May 28, Mac Thornberry, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told journalists in Delhi that there is "a lot of concern in the US in both the administration and the Congress" over the S-400 system. "And there is concern that any country, and it is not just India that is looking at clearing it, but any country that acquires that system will complicate our ability to work out inter-operability," Thornberry said.

THE WAY OUT

INDIA-USA MILITARY AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP HAS GROWN MANIFOLD SINCE 2008: CAATSA forces New Delhi to choose between strategic partners Russia and the US. A decade since the signing of the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008, the relationship has blossomed into a thriving arms partnership, with the United States becoming India's second-largest arms partner . Both countries regularly hold a series of military manoeuvres under the recently renamed 'Indo-Pacific Command' and have shared common concerns over a rising China.

USA UNPREDICTABILITY AND UNILATERALISM DRIVING INDIA RUSSIA CLOSE: Meanwhile, CAATSA and the unpredictability of the Donald Trump administration have forced a subtle reset in New Delhi and driving India and Russia closer.

INDIA STANDS FIRM IN ITS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: Even as the US gears up to counter a China-Russia axis, New Delhi has reiterated its belief in a multi-polar world. On May 21, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Putin at an informal summit in Sochi, Russia. On May 29, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, a key figure in the India-Russia relationship, got Pankaj Saran, India's ambassador to Russia, as his deputy national security advisor. And on June 5, defence minister Sitharaman came out with an emphatic endorsement. "In all our engagements with the United States, we have clearly explained to them that India and Russia's defence cooperation has been going on for a long time and that it is a time-tested relationship. We have also mentioned that CAATSA cannot be impacting on this," she said in New Delhi. Adds a senior defence official: "We are not the Dominican Republic or Canada, we are India and we have conveyed our concerns to the US administration."

KEY INDO-PACIFIC PLAYERS PROCURE FROM RUSSIA; CAATSA WONT BE SEEN IN A POSITIVE LIGHT: "It is quite obvious there is a division between the Trump Administration and the US Congress, which is full of Russia baiters, on this issue," says G Parthasarathy, former Indian High commissioner to Pakistan. "Amongst the countries the US is targeting and looking for cooperation for its Indo-Pacific strategy are Vietnam, Indonesia and India--all three vital for achieving its aims. All three have placed orders for or looking forward to doing this for more Russian weaponry. The Americans will have to be told that not just the "Quad" but many who share our views on Indo-Pacific will look at this action as not being friendly."

USA EXECUTIVE BRANCH AWARE OF THE CHALLENGES CAATSA POSES ON FOREIGN POLICY FRONT: The United States was already conscious of the impact of CAATSA on partners like India. Signing the bill into law last August, President Donald Trump raised objections, terming it 'seriously flawed' because it limited the executive branch's flexibility on foreign policy. On April 27, Mattis told a Congressional hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee that a national security waiver be urgently provided to India and other countries, which are trying to turn away from Russian-sourced weapons, to avoid sanctions under CAATSA.

US SENATE INSERTED 4 NEW CLAUSES IN CAATSA TO GIVE INDIA A QUALIFIED EXEMPTION: Responding to the request, the US Senate this month inserted four new clauses under Section 1292 of the Act 'Enhancing Defense and Security Cooperation with India' in its defence budget passed last month. The new clauses empower the Trump administration to suspend CAATSA sanctions, but it has to certify that India was reducing its dependency on Russia 'and has a desire to continue doing so', as Thornberry told the media in New Delhi. The clauses are of the nature of describing 'limitations that hinder or slow (down) progress' in Indo-US ties, 'a description of actions India is taking, or the actions the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State believe India should take', to advance the relationship with the United States, measures that can be taken by the United States and India to improve interoperability. And, lastly, it also inserts a clause 'progress in enabling agreements between the United States and India'. The last reflects the US administration's pique over India's slow progress in 'foundation agreements', such as LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), signed in 2016 after nearly a decade. The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement ( BECA) are yet to be signed.

USA WILL NEVER SHARE OR SELL ADVANCED MILITARY TECH; SOME KEY EQUIPMENT CAN COME ONLY FROM RUSSIA; EXAMPLE INS ARIHANT THAT COMPLETED INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRIAD: "It's not just the S-400 deal, but India's strategic autonomy that is at stake," says Vice Admiral A.K. Singh (retired), a former commanding-in-chief, Eastern Naval Command. "Hopefully, our leaders will realise we cannot break ties with Russia. The United States is the world leader in anti-submarine warfare, stealth technology and drone technology, but will never part with it or even sell it. There are certain technologies only the Russians will give us." With the 2016 commissioning of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant, India recently operationalised the third leg of its nuclear triad, the ability to fire nuclear-tipped missiles from under the sea. This could not have been done without considerable Russian assistance.

ON THE GROUND

Meanwhile, India and Russia have moved away from US dollars and euros and now do business in rupees and roubles. Agreements are being re-drafted and new modes of payments being established between Indian and Russian state-owned banks. Syndicate Bank, Vijaya Bank and the Indian Bank and Sberbank of Russia have been designated to handle the rupee-rouble payments for India to pay for Russian military purchases. The payments bypass SWIFT transactions, which are routed through New York. The first contracts were redrawn recently for the $208 million mid-life upgrade of a Russian-built Kilo class submarine in Russia. But while these relatively minor deals might go under the radar, it is the big-ticket items like the S-400 missile system that have the potential to cause worry in South Block.

CLEAR MESSAGE SHOULD GO OUT TO USA THAT COERCION WILL BACKFIRE : "We have to stand firm while making payments arrangements, making it clear to the US that any attempt to pressurise us on the score will only make us prefer exporters like France, Germany and Israel, over US firms. We have to mobilize the Indian community and other friends in the US to lobby on this. There are clearly many in the Administration and Academia who share our views. The Secretaries of State and Defence back us," says Parthasarathy.

A waiver from the US administration will leave a strong negotiation lever in with the US, which they can use to extract other concessions from India. Under present circumstances, India's choices seem pretty limited.

xxx

Allies, interrupted

06.07.18 TH

There are enough signs that relations between India and the United States have suffered, with officials in both capitals now freely conceding that their interests are diverging. 

From the U.S. side, policy decisions by President Donald Trump to walk out of the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, and the U.S. Congress’s CAATSA law sanctioning Iran and Russia have set up an inevitable conflict. 

Mr. Trump’s insistence on tough sanctions against all those continuing to engage with Iran and Russia limits India’s options on energy security and defence procurement. 

During her visit last week, Nikki Haley, the U.S. envoy to the UN, told India to “revise” its relationship with Iran; this line is expected to be reiterated by U.S. interlocutors in the coming days. 

Added to this confrontation is the U.S.’s tough policy on trade tariffs, applied to ally and adversary alike, including India. 

For its part, the Narendra Modi government has taken a policy turn away from four years of a pro-U.S. tilt. Mr. Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue last month, in which he invoked the long-lapsed phrase “strategic autonomy”, set at rest any doubt that there is a reset in his foreign policy. Since January, he has personally reached out to the Chinese and Russian Presidents in informal summits, and invited the Iranian President to Delhi. 

At variance with the U.S. position on limiting engagement with these very countries, India promised to raise oil imports from Iran this year, committed to far greater engagement on the Chabahar port project and oilfields in Iran, while negotiating a $5.5 billion deal with Russia for the S-400 Triumf missile systems. These will trigger U.S. sanctions unless the two countries reach a compromise.

What is more troubling for bilateral ties is that despite the obvious problems, the political will to address these issues is now considerably diminished. In contrast to his meetings with the Russian and Chinese leaderships, Mr. Modi has had little contact with Mr. Trump since their meeting in Manila last November, which by all accounts did not go well. 

Now, the postponement of the Indian Foreign and Defence Ministers’ “2+2” dialogue with their U.S. counterparts has denied the governments a chance to gather together the fraying bilateral threads. It is imperative that the dialogue be quickly rescheduled. While the U.S. has traditionally applied pressure on its allies to limit their engagement with countries it considers to be threats to the international order, the manner in which deadlines have been publicly issued by the State Department twice this week will only make its demands more difficult for India to even consider. 

India must now decide how best to deal with the ultimatums, with U.S. sanctions kicking in by November. The clock is ticking on the relationship.

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The bilateral limits of hype

04.07.18 TH

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump have both built their politics on the promise of making their countries great again. Placing India and the U.S., respectively, as leaders on the world stage is the stated objective of their foreign policy. The project of regaining national glory is based on another assumption that they inherited a mess from their respective predecessors. Yet another shared trait is their love for spectacle over meticulous, prolonged and often frustrating pursuit of strategic goals.

Theatre as strategy

The postponement of the India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue between the Foreign and Defence Ministers of both countries, that had been scheduled for this week, has to be understood in the context of the similar personality traits of Mr. Trump and Mr. Modi. Hugging Mr. Trump may be a good spectacle for Mr. Modi, but the same may not be true for the former. Mr. Trump has set his eyes on spectacles that suit him. Mr. Trump, still basking in the denuclearisation deal that he’s said to have struck with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, is now looking forward to the next big event: a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. His every move on the global stage enrages his domestic political opponents and the professional strategic community alike and he is happy, as this keeps his political base constantly on the boil.

North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan, trade deficit, and all global challenges before America are the faults of his predecessors, he repeatedly tells supporters. Most recently, at the G7 summit in Canada in June, he declared: “I blame our past leaders for allowing this to happen (trade deficits)…You can go back 50 years, frankly.” Such rhetoric may sound familiar to Indians. In Mr. Trump’s war on the legacy of all Presidents before him, India is on the wrong side. The remarkable growth in India-U.S. relations since the turn of the century had been nurtured by three U.S. Presidents, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, two Democrats and one Republican who have all been the target of Mr. Trump’s ire. India neither promises him the opportunity of a spectacle nor offers the grounds for destructing the legacy of a predecessor. So he told Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to deal with North Korea and Russia, and 2+2 with India could wait. “Nobody wakes up in DC daily thinking of India,” says a former U.S. ambassador to India, pointing out that 16 months into the new administration, there is no Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia in the State Department.

Impact on ties

To buttress one’s own claim to be a trailblazer by denying the achievements of predecessors may be good political tactics for these leaders, but trying to wish away history itself is not a sustainable strategy. Against the backdrop of a programmatic negation of history in both countries, Mr. Trump’s bursts of unhinged rhetoric against China and Pakistan lend themselves to easy and convenient interpretations by supporters of improved U.S.-India ties as moments of enlightenment for the U.S., even as turning points.

But Mr. Trump cannot undo all the legacy with a magic tweet. U.S. relations with Pakistan and China took shape during the Cold War. Pakistan might be the longest ally of the U.S. after the U.K., first in the fight against communism, and then in the fight against terror that was created in the first fight. China used the Cold War to its own advantage in its ties with the U.S.

China today threatens the dominance of the U.S., but the America’s security establishment and political elite are obsessed with Russia. India gets caught in that internal American fight too, such as in the case of an American law that now requires the President to impose sanctions on any country that has significant security relations with Russia.

Mr. Trump sees the challenges posed by China, but not in a manner helpful for India. For, India and China are in the same basket for Mr. Trump on many issues that agitate him. He has repeatedly mentioned India and China in the same breath as countries that duped his predecessors on climate and trade deals. His administration considers India and China as violators of intellectual property laws, as countries that put barriers to trade and subsidise exports and use state power to control markets. The nationalists in the Trump administration, including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro are all gunning for China, and India is in the same firing line. Many Americans who think that China took the U.S. for a ride — many Democrats among them — suspect that India is trying to do the same thing.

But there are two constituencies in the U.S. that promote India against China: the Pentagon and the U.S. arms industry. This works to India’s favour. While the Obama administration could not overcome State Department objections to offer India even unarmed drones, the Trump administration has done so, offering armed drones. Here, Mr. Trump is not guided by any grand theories of ‘rule-based order’, etc. that professional strategists talk about, but by the opportunity to sell.

Given Mr. Trump’s views on trade, American companies that used to argue China’s case are now guarded in their approach. Still, companies such as General Motors and Ford have come out against a trade war with China. This has implications for India too. American companies that eye the Indian market are allies in the pushback against Mr. Trump’s nationalist trade policies. Mr. Modi has realised this dynamic that puts India and China in the same corner in Mr. Trump’s perspective — and that significantly explains his Wuhan summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, the third big leader who is gaming for the glory of his country.

War against legacy

The enlightenment that Mr. Trump purportedly brought on America’s Af-Pak policy also appears to have been short-lived. If one looks at the tough messages from Nikki Haley, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, in New Delhi recently on Pakistan and Iran, it is clear where the political priorities of the Trump administration lies. Here again, Mr. Trump is determined to gut his predecessor’s legacy, a key component of which was rapprochement with Iran. The war in Afghanistan is the worst optics for Mr. Trump’s showman politics, and his administration’s approach has been to sweep it under the carpet. The Pentagon has restricted release of data on the war but a report last month paints a picture of a deteriorating situation. The U.S.’s ability to arm-twist Pakistan has been limited anyway, and Mr. Trump’s determination to turn the screws on Iran makes it tougher. National Security Adviser John Bolton, who had advocated bombing Iran, believes that a hardline policy against Pakistan is not desirable.

All told, Mr. Trump might accept Mr. Modi’s invitation to be the chief guest at the 2019 Republic Day parade just ahead of the Lok Sabha campaign, triggering another round of commentary on their ‘body language’ and ‘chemistry’. A series of significant defence purchases and agreements could be concluded in coming months. But India-U.S. relations will be better off without hype and grand theories, often encouraged by the government. Otherwise, every rescheduling of a meeting will be interpreted as the collapse of ties. Similarly, avoiding the hyperbole could help manage India’s troubles with Pakistan and China better. The U.S. has overlapping interests with China, and India has overlapping interests with both. The trouble with big-chest, small-heart hyper-nationalism in foreign policy is that it also causes short sightedness. The audacity of hype has its limits.

varghese.g@thehindu.co.in

UPSC: India USA Relations (Part 1)

Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IU11vR_HzyE&t=370s

Tracing History

1. 1949: Nehru visits USA; the trip precedes India’s formal proclamation of neutrality in the developing Cold War, in which it would take a leadership role within the Non-Alignment movement. This sets the tone for U.S.-India relations throughout the Cold War, creating constraints within the relationship, as well as opportunity for amity between Delhi and Moscow.

2. 1962: Nehru seeks support from USA against China; Washington supports India in the conflict, recognizing the McMahon line as the border, and provides air assistance and arms. Until the 1965 Inda-Pakistan War, strategic and military ties between Washington and Delhi remain close.

3. 1971: Bangladesh Liberation War; distance between India-USA increases; Despite evidence of the Pakistan Army’s violence against its own citizens in East Pakistan, the United States sides with Islamabad, given its mediating role in Nixon’s rapprochement with China. India also signs a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August, sharply deviating from its previous position of non-alignment in the Cold War.

4. 1974: India Completes First Nuclear Test; India detonates its first nuclear device, becoming the first nation outside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to have declared nuclear capabilities. The move contributes to a period of estrangement between the United States and India that lasts over two decades.

5. 1978: requires countries not included in the Nonproliferation Treaty—which includes India—to allow inspections of all nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. India refuses, and Washington ends all nuclear assistance to Delhi.

6. 1984: Bhopal Leak: A toxic gas and chemical leak at American-owned Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, kills thousands. India unsuccessfully seeks extradition of the company’s chief executive from the United States for criminal prosecution as the death and disability toll climbs to the tens of thousands in the ensuing years. The incident harms U.S.-India relations, and continues to complicate the bilateral relationship years after.

7. 1991: Economic Reforms; help expand economic ties with the United States. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh oversees the opening of India’s economy to international trade and investment, deregulation, initiation of privatisation, tax reforms, and inflation controlling measures that catalyze decades of fast growth.

8. 1998: India Tests Nuclear Devices; The tests draw international condemnation and badly damage India’s relationship with the United States. After recalling the U.S. ambassador to India, President Bill Clinton imposes economic sanctions, required under U.S. law.

9. 1999: Pakistani forces infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir. India launches air strikes in return, and armed conflict continues through early July. After President Clinton summons Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Washington for a Fourth of July emergency meeting, Sharif withdraws Pakistani forces from their positions beyond the Line of Control.

10. 2000: Clinton Trip Signals Warming Ties; President Bill Clinton makes the first U.S. presidential trip to India since 1978. The visit ends the estrangement of the post-1998 Indian nuclear weapons tests, although the Clinton administration presses India’s government to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum is also established during the visit. As India’s economy begins to take off, the trip indicates a further shift in Washington’s regional orientation away from its Cold War alliance with Pakistan.

11. 2001: George W. Bush administration lifts all remaining U.S. sanctions [PDF] that were imposed on India after its 1998 nuclear test.

12. March 2005: Energy Security Dialogue: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visits New Delhi, where she and Indian officials agree to start a dialogue on energy security. The visit underscores an upswing in relations despite tensions over India’s possible energy cooperation with Iran and the U.S. sale of fighter jets to Pakistan.

13. June 2005: U.S., India Sign New Defense Framework; The United States and India sign the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship [PDF], which sets priorities for defense cooperation in maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and counterterrorism. In October, the two countries conduct the largest naval exercise to date, followed by major air and land exercises.

14. July 2005: Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal; India and the United States ink the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, a ten-year defense framework that lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India. Under the agreement, India agrees to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place all its civil resources under IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the United States agrees to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. Congress gives final approval in October 2008.

The nuclear deal, completed in July 2007, makes India the only country outside of the Nonproliferation Treaty that has nuclear capabilities and is allowed to participate in nuclear commerce.

15. November 2008 Terrorist Attack: The United States cooperates closely with Indian authorities, sending FBI investigators and forensics experts.

16. April 2010: Economic and Financial Partnership: U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner makes his first official trip to India to launch the new U.S.-India Economic and Financial Partnership with Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee. The ministerial-level meetings kick off an effort to institutionalize deeper bilateral relations on economic and financial sector issues.

17. June 2010: U.S., India Hold First Strategic Dialogue: The United States and India formally convene the firstU.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. A large, high-ranking delegation of Indian officials visits Washington, DC, and Secretary Clinton lauds India as “an indispensable partner.” President Obama says the relationship “will be a defining partnership in the twenty-first century.” Subsequent dialogues follow annually.

18. November 2010: Obama Backs India Bid for UN Security Council; President Obama visits India, where he addresses Parliament and backs the country’s long-held bid for apermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The trip also highlights the countries’ economic ties, with Obama announcing $14.9 billion in trade deals. However, trade concerns around access to Indian markets and issues surrounding civil nuclear cooperation cloud the talks.

19. 2011: U.S., India Ink Cybersecurity Memorandum; The United States and India sign a Memorandum of Understanding in New Delhi to promote closer cybersecurity cooperation. The agreement is designed to fulfill one of the pillars of the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue.

20. March 2014: Diplomatic Row Sours Ties; The U.S. embassy in India announces Ambassador Nancy Powell’s resignation in the wake of a dispute over the arrest of an Indian diplomat in New York.

21. May 2014: Obama Invites Modi to U.S.

22. September 2014: Modi’s high profile UA Visit; Modi and President Obama reach agreement on a memorandum of understanding between the Export-Import Bank and an Indian energy agency, which provides up to $1 billion to help India develop low-carbon energy alternatives and aid U.S. renewable energy exports to India.

23. January 2015: Obama's Second India Visit Elevates Ties; U.S. President Barack Obama makes his second visit to India as head of state for India's Republic Day celebrations. The president heralds the relationship between the world's two largest democracies, saying, "America can be India's best partner." Obama and Indian PM Modi announce a breakthrough on nuclear-related issues that could help implement the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. Six months later, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and India’s defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, sign documents to renew the ten-year U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement.

India-U.S. Delhi Declaration of Friendship 

"Chalein saath saath; forward together we go”. Reflecting the close ties between our two great democracies, India and the United States agree to elevate our long-standing strategic partnership, with a Declaration of Friendship that strengthens and expands the relationship between our two countries

"Sanjha Prayaas, SabkaVikaas; Shared Effort, Progress For All”. Each step we take to strengthen the relationship is a step towards shaping international security, regional and global peace, prosperity and stability for years to come.

Through this Declaration of Friendship and in keeping with our national principles and laws, we respect:

• Equal opportunity for all our people through democracy, effective governance, and fundamental freedoms;
• An open, just, sustainable, and inclusive rule-based global order;
• The importance of strengthened bilateral defense ties;
• The importance of adapting to and mitigating the impact of climate change through national, bilateral and multilateral efforts;
• The beneficial impact that sustainable, inclusive development will have on our two countries and the world;
• The centrality of economic policies that support the creation of strong and sustainable jobs, inclusive development, and rising incomes; and
• Transparent and rule-based markets that seek to drive the trade and investment necessary to uplift all members of society and promote economic development.
  
  As part of this Declaration of Friendship, we commit to:
• Hold regular Summits with increased periodicity;
• Elevate the , of which the Strategic elements would continue to be chaired by the External Affairs Minister of India and the U.S. Secretary of State and the Commercial components of the Dialogue would be led by India’s Minister of Trade and Commerce and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. This reflects the United States' and India's commitment to strengthen commercial and economic ties to advance mutual prosperity, regional economic growth and stability;
• Establish secure hotlines between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States of America and National Security Advisors;
• Cooperate to develop joint ventures on strategically significant projects;
• Build meaningful security and effective counterterrorism cooperation;
• Hold regional and multilateral consultations;
• Consult and hold regular consultations in multilateral forums; and
• Leverage the talents and strengths of our people to enhance sustainable, inclusive development around the globe.

UPSC GK: What Trump’s pullout from Iran deal means for India (ECONOMICS)

India’s first reaction has been cautious, and it may gain from the US-Europe disagreement. Indian interests in Afghanistan and West Asia are at stake, and this could be the moment to plan for similar crises in future.

What is the nuclear deal from which President Donald Trump on Tuesday pulled the United States?

It is officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and informally the ‘Iran nuclear deal’. It was signed between Iran and the P5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council — US, China, France, Russia, and the UK), plus Germany and the European Union, in Vienna on July 14, 2015. The deal, aimed at preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon, involved lifting of international sanctions in return for Tehran curbing its nuclear programme. But the Trump administration says the deal did not target Iran’s ballistic missile programme, its nuclear activities beyond 2025, and its role in conflicts in Yemen and Syria. The President said the “horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made”… “didn’t bring calm,… didn’t bring peace, and it never will”.

How has India responded to the US action against the deal?

India has been extremely supportive of the deal. Prime Minister Narendra Modihad in 2016 complimented the Iranian leadership on the JCPOA and subsequent developments, and said it represented the “triumph of diplomacy and sagacity”. On Wednesday, the Ministry of External Affairs walked a diplomatic tightrope, its spokesperson Raveesh Kumar issuing an extremely cautious statement: “India has always maintained that the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and diplomacy by respecting Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as also the international community’s strong interest in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. All parties should engage constructively to address and resolve issues that have arisen with respect to the JCPOA.”

How does this statement sit with India’s position on multilateral commitments?

India has been a proactive votary of the international rules-based order. This has been its line on the South China Sea and on the 2015 Paris climate accord, to which it reiterated its commitment just days after Trump announced in June 2017 that the US was abandoning the agreement. New Delhi did not, however, articulate with sufficient clarity its position when Trump announced the US would shift its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and recognise that city as the country’s capital. On the US withdrawal from the Iran deal, India seems to be hedging its bets currently; however, if New Delhi, which has recently become a member of three multilateral export control regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group) wants to also join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a clearer articulation of commitment to JCPOA will help with the Europeans, especially the French. The complication though, is that, like France, the US too, is a strong backer of India’s NSG membership bid.

What is the implication for India on the energy trade?

Iran, India’s third-largest oil supplier after Iraq and Saudi Arabia, supplied 18.4 million tonnes (mt) of crude in the first 10 months of the 2017-18 fiscal (April 2017 to January 2018). Until 2010-11, Iran was India’s second-largest supplier after Saudi Arabia, but slipped in subsequent years as international sanctions hit. In 2013-14 and 2014-15, India bought 11 mt and 10.95 mt respectively from Iran. This rose to 12.7 mt the following year, and then jumped to 27.2 mt in 2016-17.

While the 2010-15 sanctions were imposed by global consensus, Trump has made his decision to pull out from the deal unilaterally — the UK, Germany and France have said they remain committed to the agreement with Iran; China has said the JCPOA “should be implemented in good faith by all parties”, and Russia has said it is “deeply disappointed” with the US. Should these signatories be able to ensure the deal does not collapse altogether, India could conceivably use euros to pay Iran for oil supplies.

Is there a threat to India’s strategic investment in Iran’s Chabahar port?

India is developing Chabahar as the beginning of a route to strife-torn, landlocked Afghanistan that bypasses Pakistan, and as a gateway to Central Asia. It is both a financial and a strategic investment. Over the last three years, the engagement between India and Iran on Chabahar has gathered momentum; Modi travelled to Iran in May 2016, and work is expected to be completed and the port handed over to Indian authorities by July, Iranian officials have said.

This timeline may, however, come under pressure — and get pushed to perhaps the end of the year — if American sanctions hit infrastructure development in Chabahar. However, India may still have options if the other signatories stick with the JCPOA. New Delhi will likely argue with its interlocutors in Washington that access to Afghanistan is a shared objective of both countries, and that India’s goal of helping Afghanistan’s reconstruction — at the request of the Trump administration — through $ 1 billion assistance and work in over 100 small development projects, may be affected if Chabahar is slowed down.

Chabahar is crucial to Indian interests also because Iran is seen to be offering the port to other countries as well, including China, which is already developing Pakistan’s Gwadar port next door.

What can be the implications in West Asia, especially from an Indian perspective?

Trump’s move to target Iran, and side with its regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Israel, could destabilise the region where over 8 million Indian migrants live and work. Military tensions in West Asia have forced India to evacuate its nationals in the past; New Delhi’s capacity to do so is, however, limited.

What does Trump’s move mean for the India-US relationship?

Under Trump, this relationship has been transactional. The US has been hard on Pakistan, but has asked India to be more proactive in the Indo-Pacific, with an eye on China. While there has been complementarity of interests in both these situations, the Indian establishment has been wary of committing too much on the Indo-Pacific strategy — the India-US-Japan-Australia ‘Quad’ is still taking its first baby steps. Also, faultlines between India and the US over its relationship with Russia have grown prominent of late — New Delhi is aware of these divergences, and the Iran situation will test the durability of the “strategic partnership” between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.

And what about the future of the India-Iran relationship?

The two countries have a strategic interest in keeping the relationship durable and sustainable, and would want to insulate it from the impact of sanctions. Many experts feel the government should look at options like the rupee-rial trading mechanism, and opening of Iranian banks in India and Indian banks in Iran, to facilitate movement of money and income between the two countries. The current crisis could force New Delhi and Tehran to work on a plan for similar situations in the future.

Credit: Indian Express Explained (http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/what-donald-trumps-pullout-from-iran-deal-means-for-india-5170552/)

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